Post by Tamrin on Jan 4, 2010 6:48:53 GMT 10
Why Philosophers Quote Kabbalah:
The Cases of Mendelssohn and Rosenzweig
[/b][/size]The Cases of Mendelssohn and Rosenzweig
[Excerpts - article by W. Zev Harvey, www.euro.ubbcluj.ro, Linked Above][/center]
In the introduction to his book Pardes Rimmonim, a philosophic commentary on selected difficult homilies in the Talmud, Rabbi Shemtob ibn Shaprut (late 14th century Spain) complains about certain earlier authors who have written commentaries on Talmudic homilies from the standpoint of the Kabbalah. These commentaries, he asserts, are not helpful since they are more arcane than the Talmudic homilies themselves. Ibn Shaprut defends philosophic interpretation, which is clear, and criticizes Kabbalistic interpretation, which is confusing. He praises the great Talmudist, Rabbi Solomon ibn Adret (1235-1310), for availing himself of philosophy in his Commentary on selected Talmudic homilies, but criticizes him for using also Kabbalistic sources. Kabbalah and philosophy, he argues, must not be mixed. Indeed, the Kabbalah is the very opposite of philosophy: "they are in truth two contraries, and there is no middle term between them." Ibn Shaprut thus explains that he has set out to correct the confusions of the Kabbalah by writing a commentary on the Talmudic homilies that will be in the spirit of such philosophers as Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra and Maimonides.
Ibn Shaprut's remarks are not surprising. He says what many philosophers believe. Philosophy is based on Reason alone and recognizes no other authority. Kabbalah is based on secret traditions, esoteric myths, and uncanny images; and claims to go beyond Reason. What could be more different than philosophy and Kabbalah? Philosophers may be expected to flee from the Kabbalah as fast as they can.
However, many philosophers do not flee from it. Many explicitly quote from the Zohar and other Kabbalistic books. Why would a philosopher do such a thing? I would like to raise this question with regard to two major modern Jewish philosophers, Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) and Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929).
My comments will be based, in part, on a talk I gave in Jerusalem in February, 2007, at a colloquium in memory of Professor Rivka Horwitz. The influence of Kabbalah on Jewish philosophers, including Mendelssohn and Rosenzweig, was a topic that engaged Professor Horwitz, and she wrote several important studies on it. My discussion here of Mendelssohn and Rosenzweig is indebted in no small measure to her researches.
In the Introduction to his Hebrew Commentary on Ecclesiastes (1768), Mendelssohn speaks about the methodology of biblical interpretation. Unlike Spinoza and many representatives of the Enlightenment, who were committed to the doctrine that one should pay attention only to the literal meaning of the biblical text, that is, the philological-historical meaning, Mendelssohn advocates the theory of multiple meanings found in the Zohar and other Kabbalistic texts. The Kabbalists referred to this hermeneutic theory by acronym as the "pardes" (paradise): peshat (literal meaning), remez (hint or clue), derash (homily), and sod (secret, mystery). Adapting this Kabbalisitc theory of fourfold interpretation, Mendelssohn argued that "all [four meanings] are the words of the living God, they are correct all together, and this does not contradict the ways of Intellect and Logic, and is not foreign or extraordinary to human Reason." The different meanings do not contradict one another, because they function on different levels.
Ibn Shaprut's remarks are not surprising. He says what many philosophers believe. Philosophy is based on Reason alone and recognizes no other authority. Kabbalah is based on secret traditions, esoteric myths, and uncanny images; and claims to go beyond Reason. What could be more different than philosophy and Kabbalah? Philosophers may be expected to flee from the Kabbalah as fast as they can.
However, many philosophers do not flee from it. Many explicitly quote from the Zohar and other Kabbalistic books. Why would a philosopher do such a thing? I would like to raise this question with regard to two major modern Jewish philosophers, Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) and Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929).
My comments will be based, in part, on a talk I gave in Jerusalem in February, 2007, at a colloquium in memory of Professor Rivka Horwitz. The influence of Kabbalah on Jewish philosophers, including Mendelssohn and Rosenzweig, was a topic that engaged Professor Horwitz, and she wrote several important studies on it. My discussion here of Mendelssohn and Rosenzweig is indebted in no small measure to her researches.
Mendelssohn
In the Introduction to his Hebrew Commentary on Ecclesiastes (1768), Mendelssohn speaks about the methodology of biblical interpretation. Unlike Spinoza and many representatives of the Enlightenment, who were committed to the doctrine that one should pay attention only to the literal meaning of the biblical text, that is, the philological-historical meaning, Mendelssohn advocates the theory of multiple meanings found in the Zohar and other Kabbalistic texts. The Kabbalists referred to this hermeneutic theory by acronym as the "pardes" (paradise): peshat (literal meaning), remez (hint or clue), derash (homily), and sod (secret, mystery). Adapting this Kabbalisitc theory of fourfold interpretation, Mendelssohn argued that "all [four meanings] are the words of the living God, they are correct all together, and this does not contradict the ways of Intellect and Logic, and is not foreign or extraordinary to human Reason." The different meanings do not contradict one another, because they function on different levels.
Rosenzweig
In an early essay, "Atheistic Theology" (1914), Rosenzweig addressed himself to the question of the relationship between God and human beings. He cited approvingly a dictum of Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai, describing him as "the Master of the Kabbalah." The dictum, found in several Rabbinic compilations, is as follows: "God said: When you do not testify to Me, I am not." In describing Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai as "the Master of the Kabbalah," Rosenzweig certainly does not mean to assert that Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai was truly the author of the Zohar, but he does seem to be affirming that this dictum about the relationship between God and human beings characterizes in some important way the approach of the Kabbalah. God's divinity depends on human beings.
Conclusion
Mendelssohn had a masterly knowledge of the classical and medieval Jewish sources, including the Kabbalah. He was a philosopher who used the Kabbalah as a literary source, no different from any other. He was not interested in the myths of the Kabbalah, and when he cited Kabbalistic sources he generally deleted the mythical elements. He used the Kabbalistic texts when he thought they could support or enrich his own arguments. For example, he found that the Zoharic theory of the multiple meaning of Scripture useful in developing his own hermeneutics.
Rosenzweig had a very limited knowledge of the classical and medieval Jewish sources, including the Kabbalah. He was a philosopher who used the Kabbalah precisely because he was attracted to its myths. He saw in its myths an alternative to Hegelianism – a way to by-pass Hegel, a way to go beyond him.
If Mendelssohn was eager to show that the theories he borrowed from the Kabbalah cohered with Reason, Rosenzweig was attracted to the Kabbalah precisely because it defied Reason. If Mendelssohn loved the Kabbalah despite its myths, Rosenzweig loved it because of its myths. These two philosophers gave two contrary answers to our question, "Why do philosophers quote Kabbalah?"
