Post by Tamrin on Aug 8, 2012 14:38:43 GMT 10
An Outline of the Main Features of Structuralism — Conflict
Philip A. Carter, 2 September 1984
Philip A. Carter, 2 September 1984
The perspective of Conflict Theory, together with that of Functionalism, is largely contained within the more general Structuralism perspective.
The characteristic assumption of Structuralism is that of society being an entity, rather than it merely being an abstraction of the interaction of what is perceived to be its “parts.” Society is seen to be analogous to a living being, composed of more or less interdependent parts. (There appear to be elements of structure throughout society, but it is likely that most Structuralists overestimate both its extent and its rigidity). This analogy is often extended to suppose that society is somehow greater than is the sum of its “parts.”
Furthermore, this analogy lends itself to the diagnosis of those facets of society which do not agree with the concept of a “healthy” society, being perceived by different theorists, as “pathological,” “dysfunctional,” “disjunctive,” or “alienative.” Since structure is not an absolute feature of society, Structuralism cannot provide absolute social truths, but, because there are elements of structure in society, Structuralism can sometimes partially explain particular social actions or trends. Likewise, Functionalism and Conflict Theory are applicable only to the extent that their respective, postulated structures are indeed features of society.
The divergence of Functionalism and Conflict theory can be largely explained by their assumptions in answer to the question: “Why society?” Margaret Sargent wrote that “...Functionalism assumes that society has a purpose which is to maintain order and stability, and that all the parts of society function in such a way as to maintain order.”1 Functionalism has been overemphasized in society. (According to Conflict Theory this is because Functionalism is central to the philosophy of society’s dominant group and that “...the ruling ideas of every period are the ideas of its ruling class.”2 — more on that later).
Conflict Theory however views society “... in terms of divisiveness, conflict, hostility and coercion which are inevitably generated by the fact that social organisation creates different involvement and interests for people. These interests provide a basis for the formation of groups which seek to preserve, to extend, or to realise them by taking action against other groups.”3 Little wonder, therefore, that, “to a society which regarded the relations between its parts as ruled by justice and equity and sanctified by religion, all this was more shocking than we can quite imagine.”4
Within Conflict Theory there are both conservative5 and revolutionary theories. The chief developers of which were, respectively Machiavelli and Marx.
Machiavelli [who saw conflict as an agent of social change more than a structural feature] aspired to be “... a dispassionate political scientist who described political behaviour as it actually was.”6 Garrett Mattingly questioned, “...how the scientific temper can accord with facts and generalizations equally distorted by emotion and prejudice.”7 However Machiavelli’s distinction between idealised and objective social perspectives is, itself, significant. His short-comings in developing this distinction might fairly be ascribed to his being the product of the emotive and divisive society of Renaissance Italy.
Marx considered that he, unlike Machiavelli, was one of the very few men who could “...escape their historical and social circumstances and study their own society.”8 “...Marx saw himself as a radical critic... of everything which made man an object instead of treating him as the subject of society.”9
Machiavelli and Marx differed largely in their assumptions as to the nature of man and that of history. Whereas Machiavelli’s “The Prince lays it down as a major premise that men in general are selfish, treacherous, cowardly, greedy, and above all gullible and stupid,”10 “For Marx, man is essentially rational, intelligent and sensitive,”11 having “...certain capacities and potentialities; to have capacities for example for creative self-development, for control of one’s environment, and perhaps, in particular, for having certain sorts of loving and equal relations with one’s fellow men.”12 [Ironically, in their personal lives, Marx resembled Machiavelli’s common man whereas Machiavelli resembled the potential man imagined by Marx].
Machiavelli assumed history to be either random or cyclic, saying, “...time brings with it all things, and it can bring with it the good as well as the bad and the bad as well as the good.”13 Marx however assumed history to be characterized by society being in a state of constant flux and change, but having a linear tendency, proceeding toward an egalitarian society.
These differing assumptions led Machiavelli and Marx to different assessments of the potential for, the possibility of, and the likely direction of social change. Machiavelli supposed conflict and coercion to be inevitable and inescapable features of society. Marx, however, supposed them to be features of “...the social arrangements of a society... so badly designed as to allow some men to pursue their own interests to the detriment of others.”14 He saw some potential for “... a cooperative, rational society without division of labour, without social stratification, and without government.”15
Their differing assessments, however, are not incompatible. Machiavelli simply refrained from attributing potentialities which could not be observed and verified objectively, saying, “...there is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success, nor more dangerous to administer than to introduce a new order of things.”16 He observed that “... anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation.”17
Social conflict is the consequence of the conflicting interests of different social classes. “Marx suggests that the basis for social classes might be located in the different relationships of people to the means of production.”18 “’To understand society and its development in a scientific way’, Marx says, ‘we should not look at the ideas and morality of men, or at the institutions of a society, but at its process of production, which moulds societies, including its institutions, and its ideas about itself’.”19 It being “...the character of the whole which explains the nature of the parts.”20
Marx believed that “... the guarantee of the right of private property, in the conditions of industrial society, was erecting into a private function what was in fact an enormous social power,”21 causing society to become “... split and simplified into two classes, each recognising its interests with increasing clarity...”22 Marx called the dominant class which emerged during the Industrial Revolution the bourgeoisie and the subordinate one the proletariat. A simplified summary of how he regarded their relationship might paradoxically be that society is composed of two classes: The deserving and the undeserving — The twist being that it is the latter who determine which is which.
“... Marx observed, if reality corresponded to appearance, there would be no need for science.”23 Bearing this in mind, we can see how, “law, morality, religion are to him [the proletarian] so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.”24 “These institutions will function by encouraging a certain way of thought which serves to legitimise the existing property relations and by so doing to reconcile the members of the society to them.”25 Indeed, even “... the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.”26
This mystification of the current social order, whereby it seems natural and right to favour bourgeois interests does much to maintain that order. Where it alone is not enough to do so the bourgeoisie resort to either coercion (threatening to use their power) or conflict (bringing their power into action).
The interests of different bourgeois groups are not only at odds with those of the proletariat but with other bourgeois groups as well. In the consequent disputes the bourgeoisie “... sees itself compelled to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for its help, and thus, to drag it into the political arena.”27 The significance of this, as Machiavelli observed, is that “... anyone who is the cause of another’s becoming powerful comes to ruin himself...”28
Our current social order may therefore be no more permanent than were those preceding it. The question remains as to whether the proletariat will dominate a succeeding order for the good of all or if a new dominant class will arise, promoting its own interests at the expense of subordinate groups?
REFERENCES
1. Sargent, M., Sociology for Australians, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1983, p.80.
2. Long, M., “Marx —the Materialist Conception of History and Economics” in Australian Broadcasting Commission, Marx and Beyond, ABC, Sydney, 1973, p.31.
3. Cuff, E.C. & Payne, G.C.F., Perspectives in Sociology, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1979, pp. 85/6.
4.Mattingly, G., “Machiavelli” in Plumb, J.H. (Ed.), The Penguin Book of the Renaissance, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1964, p.72.
5. Sargent, op. cit., p.79.
6. Mattingly, op. cit., p.73.
7. Ibid., p.74.
8. Cuff & Payne, op. cit., p.57.
9. Long, M. & Poole, R., “Marx —the Task and Early Work” in Australian Broadcasting Commission, Marx and Beyond, ABC, Sydney, 1973, p.12.
10. Mattingly, op. cit., p.71.
11. Cuff & Payne, op. cit., p.57.
12. Long & Poole, op. cit., p.25
13. Machiavelli, N., The Prince, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, p.12.
14. Cuff & Payne, op. cit., p.57.
15. Long & Poole, op. cit., p.15.
16. Machiavelli, op. cit., p.21.
17. Ibid., p.52.
18. Cuff & Payne, op. cit., p.66.
19. Long, op. cit., p.28.
20. Ibid., p.29.
21. Long & Poole,op. cit., p.14.
22. Ibid., p.20.
23. Long, op. cit., p.33.
24. Marx, K. & Engels, F., Manifesto of the Communist Party, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1970, pp.44/5.
25. Long, op. cit., p.31.
26. Marx & Engels, op. cit., p.33.
27. Ibid., p.43.
28. Machiavelli, op. cit., p.15.
